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DOMINATION AND THE FREE WILL DEFENSE:
A REPLY TO PRUSS
Daniel Speak

Few arguments have enjoyed as strong a reputation for philosophical success
as Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense (FWD). Despite the striking reputation
for decisiveness, however, concerns about the success of the FWD have begun
to trickle into the philosophical literature. In a recent article in this journal,
Alexander Pruss has contributed to this flow with an intriguing argument
that a proposition necessary to the success of Plantinga’s FWD is false. Specifically, Pruss has argued, contrary to the FWD, that, necessarily, God is able
to actualize a world containing at least one significantly free creature who
never does anything morally wrong. Thus, Pruss purports to demonstrate
that it is not possible that every creaturely essence suffers from transworld
depravity. Since the possibility of universal transworld depravity is essential to Plantinga’s defense, Pruss concludes that the defense in its Plantingian
form ultimately fails. After presenting Pruss’s argument, I argue that the free
will defender can resist it, in large part because the free will defender can
quite reasonably reject the dominance principle on which the supposed counterexample depends.

Few arguments have enjoyed as strong a reputation for philosophical
success as Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense (FWD). Despite the striking
reputation for decisiveness, however, concerns about the success of the
FWD have begun to trickle into the philosophical literature. In fact, this
may understate the situation; it may be more accurate to describe the flow
of complaints as substantially more than a trickle.1 In a recent article in this
journal, Alexander Pruss has contributed to this flow with an intriguing
argument that a proposition necessary to the success of Plantinga’s FWD

1
For example: Keith DeRose, “Plantinga, Presumption, Possibility, and the Problem of
Evil,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991), 497–512; Daniel Howard-Snyder and John
O’Leary-Hawthorne, “Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga’s Free Will Defense,” International
Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 44 (1998), 1–21; Marilyn Adams, Horrendous Evils and
the Goodness of God (Cornell University Press, 1999); Richard Otte, “Transworld Depravity
and Unobtainable Worlds,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2009) 165–177; Jeff
Speaks, “Foreknowledge, Evil, and Compatibility Arguments,” Faith and Philosophy 28 (2011),
528–562; and Daniel Howard-Snyder, “The Logical Problem of Evil: Mackie and Plantinga,”
in The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil, ed. Justin McBrayer and Daniel HowardSnyder (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).
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is false.2 Specifically, Pruss has argued, contrary to the FWD, that, necessarily, God is able to actualize a “morally perfect world”—that is, a world
containing at least one significantly free creature who never does anything
morally wrong. Thus, Pruss purports to demonstrate that it is not, after all,
possible that every creaturely essence suffers from transworld depravity.
Since the possibility of universal transworld depravity is essential to
Plantinga’s defense, Pruss concludes that the defense in its Plantingian
form ultimately fails. After presenting Pruss’s argument, I argue that the
free will defender can resist it, in large part because the free will defender
can quite reasonably reject the dominance principle on which the supposed counterexample depends.
1. Pruss’s Argument
Let’s remind ourselves that Plantinga formulated his free will defense as
a response to logical versions of the problem of evil that claimed to identify an inconsistency in the set of propositions theists typically endorse.
In the face of this version of the problem, the goal of the FWD was to
defend the broadly logical compatibility of God and evil.3 Crucial to the
success of Plantinga’s defense was his argument for the claim that, possibly, God cannot actualize a world devoid of moral evil that also contains
creatures enjoying significant free will. And this crucial part of the overall
defense depends upon a modal judgment that, possibly, everyone suffers
from transworld depravity. Plantinga characterizes transworld depravity,
very roughly, as the property a person might have according to which
he would freely do something morally wrong in any possible world in
which he could be actualized.4 And “[w]hat is important about the idea
2
Alexander R. Pruss, “A Counterexample to Plantinga’s Free Will Defense,” Faith and Philosophy 29:4 (2012), 400–415.
3
Plantinga certainly describes his project in terms of establishing this compatibility; but
for an argument that this isn’t what was accomplished by the FWD, see Speaks, “Foreknowledge, Evil, and Compatibility Arguments.” (It may need to be emphasized that Speaks is
not Speak. Jeff Speaks, the author of the noted and noteworthy 2011 article, is clearly much
smarter than Daniel Speak, the author of the present article. The confusion is natural and
easy, however. I am sure that I have profited from the confusion in some cases. I suspect,
therefore, that Jeff Speaks has, unfortunately, been tainted by it. In the interest of fairness,
then, I should probably do my best to undercut the confusion. Thus, this parenthetical.)
4
The definition of transworld depravity that Plantinga initially offered was this:
An essence E suffers from transworld depravity if and only if for every world W such
that E entails the property is significantly free in W and does only what is right in
W, there is a state of affairs T and an action A such that

(1) T is the largest state of affairs God strongly actualizes in W,
(2) A is morally significant for E’s instantiation in W,
and
(3) if God had strongly actualized T, E’s instantiation would have gone wrong
with respect to A.
See The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 188.
Now almost everyone (including Plantinga) concedes that Richard Otte (2009) has shown
that this account of transworld depravity will not get the free will defender the result she
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of transworld depravity,” Plantinga emphasizes, “is that if a person suffers from it, then it was not within God’s power to actualize any world in
which that person is significantly free but does no wrong—that is, a world
in which he produces moral good but not moral evil.”5 Now for the crucial
modal judgment: “But clearly it is possible that everybody suffers from
transworld depravity.”6
Pruss’s argument against the success of Plantinga’s defense turns on
an assessment of the modal status of universal transworld depravity. Assuming standard Molinism, as Plantinga’s defense does, Pruss claims to
be able to show that God could have actualized a world in which human
beings are significantly free and yet in which they never act wrongly. If
the argument goes through, then it demonstrates that universal transworld depravity is not, contrary to Plantinga’s defense, possible after all.
In essence, then, Pruss claims that Molinism, together with some adjunct
premises, entails that at least some creatures do not suffer from transworld
depravity and thus that it was within God’s power to create a world with
moral good but without moral evil.
A crucial element of Pruss’s argument is what he calls the Domination
Principle:7
(DP) Necessarily: If (a) C and C* are antecedents appropriate to <x freely
chooses A>, (b) C* dominates C for x choosing A and (c) C→(x freely chooses
A), then C*→(x freely chooses A).

If DP is true, then it stands to explain the intuition Plantinga announced
regarding Mayor Curley Smith’s bribe. If Curley has freely accepted a
bribe of $35,000, then we should be able to trust in the truth of this related
counterfactual:
(Bigger Bribe) If Curley had been offered $36, 000, he would freely have
taken the bribe.
Since the offer of $36, 000 obviously dominates the offer of $35, 000 (setting
aside a few weird possible cases), DP accounts for what seems to us to be
the truth of (Bigger Bribe).
Pruss contends that if we do accept some domination principle like DP,
then it will be possible, by virtue of domination, for God to actualize a
world in which there are free beings who do not choose wrongly. Here is
his case. Suppose that wj is a world in which God forbids Eve from eating
wants—namely, that it is possible everyone suffers from it. Nevertheless, Otte has also shown
that some slight modifications, quite clearly in keeping with Plantinga’s initial intentions,
can avoid the problems and permit the reformed version of transworld depravity to function
just as well within the rest of the FWD.
5
Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, 186.
6
Ibid., 186.
7
The intuitive idea behind “dominance” as Pruss is thinking about it seems to be of one
circumstance dominating another for an agent’s action by containing all the same “pros” for
the action and some additional ones (or fewer “cons”).
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the apple, and in which she does not eat the apple but dances a jig instead
(and further suppose that eating the apple and dancing the jig are the
only two options for her). Suppose also that there is a world wa in which
God forbids Eve from eating the apple but, unfortunately, in which Eve
nevertheless eats the apple. Parallel to these worlds, Pruss asks us also
to suppose that wj* is a world just like wj except that in wj* God forbids
Eve from dancing a jig (and not from eating the apple). Nevertheless, she
still dances the jig as she does in wj. Finally, grant that there is a world
wa* that is just like wa except that in wa* God forbids Eve from dancing a
jig (and not from eating the apple). Nevertheless, she still eats the apple
as she does in wa. What Pruss notes is that both wj and wa* are “morally
perfect” worlds. In both, there is significant creaturely freedom and no
one does wrong. If God can guarantee that either wj or wa* is actualized,
then God can indeed actualize a possible world with freedom and without
wrongdoing, contrary to the supposition of the possibility of universal
transworld depravity; and Pruss does think that, given Molinism, God can
in fact guarantee that one or the other of these worlds is actualized.
How? Well, keep in mind that God knows the truth of all the true conditionals of free will. So if it is true that if God had prohibited Eve from apple
eating (C), then Eve would have freely danced a jig (J), then God knows this.
And if God does know this CCF, then God can bring it about that Eve
freely dances a jig by bringing it about that (C) is the case—by prohibiting
her apple eating. Similarly, if it is true that if God had prohibited jig dancing
(C*), then Eve would have freely eaten the apple (A), then God knows this. And
if God knows this CCF, then God can bring it about that Eve freely eats
the apple by bringing it about that (C*) is the case—by prohibiting her
jig dancing. Pruss’s strategy from here is to attempt to show that one or
the other of these two counterfactual conditionals is true. In other words,
either C→J or C*→A is true (where “→” indicates the counterfactual conditional). To execute this strategy, Pruss argues that the denial of the first
of these conditionals materially implicates the second. Thus, he thinks he
can demonstrate that if ~(C→J), then C*→A. For we should allow, Pruss
argues, that if ~(C→J) is true, then C→~J is true.8 Furthermore, since Eve’s
only choice is between eating the apple and dancing a jig, we can see that
C→A follows from C→~J. Now, for the crucial role of the dominance
principle. Given DP, we can infer C*→A from C→A. This is because C*
dominates C in the relevant sense. The only thing that is different between
C* and C is God’s prohibition. If Eve eats the apple when prohibited from
doing so, then she will also eat the apple when she is not prohibited from
doing so (when she is prohibited, instead, from dancing a jig).
This means that either C→J or C*→A is true. Whichever is true, God
knows this. As a result, God can guarantee a morally perfect world. If C→J
is true, then God will be able to get a morally perfect world by bringing it
8
By an application of the conditional law of excluded middle (CLEM) for counterfactuals
of creaturely freedom—which, according to Pruss, the standard Molinist accepts.
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about that C is the case, thereby actualizing wj. If C*→A is true, then God
will be able to get a morally perfect world by bringing it about that C* is
the case, thereby actualizing wa*. Since all of the premises of this argument
are supposed to be necessary truths, the conclusion is that, necessarily,
there is a morally perfect world that God can actualize. That is, it is not
possible that everyone suffers from transworld depravity—and, therefore,
Plantinga’s defense fails, depending as it does on this possibility.
2. Reply
To see why I do not think we should be persuaded by this argument to
conclude that Plantinga’s defense fails, we need to turn to the conditions
that must be met by a compelling counter-defense. Since the proponent of
the logical argument from evil is accusing theism simpliciter of inconsistency, and since the free will defender has offered a set of propositions that
the theist could, it appears, reasonably endorse and that avoid inconsistency, the counter-defender (like Pruss here, with his black hat on) needs
to show us that this is only an appearance. Pruss must show, that is, that
the propositions the theist must accept (together with those propositions
constitutive of the defense) involve an inconsistency. Granting for the sake
of argument that Pruss’s argument is valid, the question before us, then,
is whether the premises of his argument are among the propositions that
the theist must accept. And here I think the answer is pretty clearly that
they are not.
The propositions that the theist (merely qua theist) must accept are
those essential to theism together with those that are plausibly regarded
as necessary truths. So, consider the crucial dominance principle DP. Pruss
frames it as a necessary truth according to which an agent who freely
performs an action under one set of conditions will also freely perform
the action under dominating conditions. DP doesn’t appear to express a
proposition essential to theism. This means that for the invocation of DP
to function properly in an argument to the conclusion that the FWD fails,
it will have to be that DP is reasonably thought to be a necessary truth.
But remember, also, that (given the goals of the logical problem) it is the
theist merely qua theist who must reasonably think that DP is a necessary
truth. In other words, DP can function properly in an argument against
Plantinga’s free will defense only if it would be in the neighborhood of
incoherent for the theist to reject DP. And surely it isn’t.
I myself think that DP is flatly false, but I won’t try to argue for this
conclusion here (in part because the argument would take up too much
space and in part because doing so would have the potential to mislead
us about where the dialectical burdens lie).9 For all that needs to be shown
9
To gesture at the shape of such an argument, however, consider this intriguing counterexample to DP presented to me in correspondence by Mike Rea. DP suggests that a teenager
who would be rational to freely accept a babysitting job offered at $10 per hour would also
be rational to freely accept the same babysitting job offered at $1 billion per hour. But, as
Rea rightly insists, a babysitter offered $1 billion per hour “ought to become very suspicious
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is that it is not incoherent for the theist (merely qua theist) to reject DP. To
do this briefly, consider the case that Pruss makes for the domination principle. One aspect of this case involves the supposed explanatory power of
the principle with respect to this supposed truth regarding Curley Smith’s
bribe:
(2) If any consideration in favor of taking the smaller bribe would apply at
least as well to the larger and any consideration there would be against taking the larger bribe also in fact applied at least as well to the smaller, and
if Smith prefers more money to less money, then: Smith is offered a larger
bribe → Smith (still) freely accepts the bribe.10

Since DP stands to explain this supposed datum, it gives us a reason to
accept DP. But must we accept this supposed datum? More specifically,
must the theist (merely qua theist) accept this datum? Not clearly. Libertarians are bound to be suspicious about it. Here’s a story that would make
the suspicions coherent. When Smith was considering the bribe of $35,000,
imagine that it was a very close call for him. But he wasn’t wavering on
the price. He was wavering over the tension between the competing moral
and prudential considerations. Since it was a free choice, he could have rejected the bribe on the basis of the moral considerations that were bumping
around in his mind with some real force at the time of his actual decision
to take the bribe. Furthermore, the extra $1,000 in the dominating case
would have been essentially irrelevant to Smith. The question for him was
about which kinds of considerations (moral or prudential) to be moved
by. And since it was a close call in the actual case, and since the dollar
value was irrelevant, he might freely have rejected the bribe had he been
offered $36,000. That is, Pruss’s (2) need not be taken as a datum requiring
explanation—in terms of a domination principle like DP or whatever. In
fact, the coherence of this story about Curley should be enough, by itself,
to show that the libertarian (whether a theist or not) need not accept DP.
By way of reply, Pruss might reiterate another point he has made in
favor of his domination principle. He insists that, “[t]he most promising
approach to responding to the randomness objection [to libertarianism]
appears to be to hold that choices are always made because of considerations, even when the choices are not determined by these considerations.
. . . But if choices are made because of considerations, libertarians, whether
Molinist or not, should accept [a dominance principle].”11 However, in
the case I’ve given, Curley would be making his free choice to reject the
$36,000 bribe because of considerations; namely, the moral ones—that, as it
happens didn’t quite move him to action when he was offered $35,000, but
very well could have (it was a close call, after all).

and reject the proposal—and this even if, ceteris paribus, he or she would prefer $1 billion
to $10.”
10
Pruss, “A Counterexample to Plantinga’s Free Will Defense,” 403.
11
Ibid., 404.
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Close-call Curley also helps to fill in the aporia in an argument Pruss
highlights in responding to an objection roughly like the one I am advancing here. Pruss notes that libertarians to whom he has presented his
argument have been inclined to reject the dominance principle; pointing,
in some cases, to what he calls the Counterfactual Repeat Intuition (CRI)
by way of justification:
(CRI) If an agent freely chooses A in circumstances C, then it is possible that
if the memories of her choice and of its consequences were deleted and she
were put for a second time in circumstances just like C, she would or at least
might choose differently from how she did the first time.12

Pruss claims to accept CRI but also insists that he can see no good route
from it to the denial of his dominance principle. Perhaps I can help.
If an agent can freely choose differently in a repeat situation without
running afoul of the requirement to choose on the basis of considerations,
then the considerations on the basis of which the agent chooses on the
first run must be different from those on basis of which she chooses on
the repeat run. If the choice were based on the same considerations in
both scenarios, we would lack an intelligible account of the difference in
outcome. Thus, someone who accepts CRI has already accepted the basic
conditions of my close-call Curley case. That is, he has already accepted
that an agent is able to freely choose to perform an action on the basis of
(say) prudential considerations while also being able, under the very same
circumstances, to freely choose to perform an alternative action on the
basis of (say) moral considerations. Plausibly, however, the deliberation
an agent engages in when deciding whether to act on either prudential
or moral considerations need not respect the simple dominance calculus
that principles like DP presuppose. If I am on the fence about whether to
break a promise to a friend to pick her up at the airport in order to make
use of an offer of free tickets to a concert, there is no reason to suppose
that adding free hot dogs to the concert experience will so much as move
the deliberative needle. It might; but it need not, because what I am trying
to decide is which kind of considerations to act on—and the hot dogs
may reasonably be irrelevant to that determination, being just more of
the prudential considerations themselves. It is this thought that animates
my version of close-call Curley. If Curley is sincerely torn between the demands of morality and the call of personal gain, then there is no reason to
suppose that an extra $1,000 is a difference-maker. And if the extra money
is not a difference-maker, and one is already prepared to accept CRI, then
it will also be reasonable to think that close-call Curley might have freely
refused the bribe at $36,000, his willingness to accept the bribe at $35,000
notwithstanding. Thus, there is, after all, a fairly strong argument from
CRI to the denial of DP.

12

Ibid., 410.
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Put in terms of Pruss’s Eve cases, rejecting DP on the basis of the above
sort of reasoning amounts to allowing that even if Eve freely chooses to
dance a jig when she is commanded by God not to do so, she might freely
choose not to dance a jig (freely choose instead to eat the apple) when
she is commanded by God not to eat the apple. The fact that jig dancing
dominates in the second case may not result in jig dancing. How could
this be? Consider a parallel with close-call Curley. The considerations that
Eve takes to favor jig dancing have to do with merriment. The considerations she takes to favor eating the apple have to do with yumminess. But
in the original case, suppose it is a close call for Eve whether she freely
allows herself to be moved by merriment to dance the jig or by yumminess to eat the apple. In fact, holding everything fixed, and running a
repeat on the situation, she would dance the jig about 50 percent of the
time, let’s suppose. Suppose further that what God commands is not a
difference-maker for her under these conditions and plays almost no role
in her initial deliberations in circumstances C (when she acted contrary
to God’s prohibition). By comparison with the values of merriment and
yumminess, God’s commands do not move her deliberative needle very
much. What we are imagining is that Eve takes the fact that a certain action is commanded by God as some reason in favor of the action but not
a particularly forceful one, and one not on the same evaluative scale as
the considerations of merriment and/or yumminess. Then it need not be
surprising that, though she freely dances a jig when commanded not to,
she might nevertheless have eaten the apple had there been no divine prohibition against dancing the jig (as in circumstances C*).
I take this line of reply to put substantial pressure on the claim that
Pruss’s Eve case constitutes a counterexample to Plantinga’s FWD. To
function as a counterexample, it must be incumbent upon the theist to
accept the various elements of the case. However, since DP is neither a
proposition essential to theism nor reasonably regarded as a necessary
truth (as my argument just demonstrated), it cannot be forced upon the
theist in the way demanded of a counterexample to Plantinga’s FWD.
3. Modifying DP?
For all of this, it may not be the end of the story. It may still be possible
for Pruss to respond by weakening his domination principle. All my argument has shown, he might claim, is that a general version of DP can be
resisted by the proponent of the free will defense. Perhaps, however, a
more specific version—that God could apply in Eve’s case—can be forced
upon the free will defender. DP allowed Pruss to construct a case in which
what could be interpreted as a small bit of domination could assure a particular free choice from Eve. If denying DP blocked this case, it may be that
Pruss can get the result he wants simply by increasing the domination in
Eve’s second case and appealing to a weaker domination principle that
will be harder to resist. For surely it is true that if Eve freely dances a jig in
circumstances C, then there is some circumstance C** in which jig dancing
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so significantly dominates apple eating that Eve will definitely choose
freely to dance the jig. Formalizing this thought a bit, we get:
(DP*) Necessarily, if C is an antecedent appropriate to <x freely chooses
A>, then there is some C** that dominates C for x choosing A, and is
such that if C→ (x freely chooses A), then C**→(x freely chooses A).
The force of DP* comes from the fact that, unlike DP, it does not require
that any amount of dominance with respect to A in circumstances C*
over circumstances C results in a free choice to A in C*. It insists only
that there is some circumstance C** that so dominates C with respect to
freely choosing A that we (and, more importantly, God) can be certain
that, given that x would freely choose A in C, x would also freely choose
A in C**. What matters for a Pruss-style objection to the FWD is that it
certainly seems that the truth of DP* would allow God to get a morally
perfect world either by bringing it about that C obtains (in the case where
God knows that C→J) or by bringing it about that C** obtains (in the case
where God knows, rather, that C**→A).
I concede that DP* is plausible—on my view, substantially more plausible that DP. I also will admit that the Pruss-style argument reconfigured
in terms of DP* strikes me as quite forceful. That is, I am attracted to the
conclusion that, given DP*, the total package of theistic commitments
Plantinga originally deployed to block the logical problem of evil will turn
out to be incoherent because universal transworld depravity is not possible after all. But an argument that Plantinga’s defense is a failure cannot
succeed merely by way of persuading one theist (or even many) that
universal transworld depravity is impossible. The question is whether
it would be coherent for a reasonable theist to continue to believe that
universal transworld depravity is possible, even in the face of the modified Pruss-style argument based on DP*. The following line of argument
would, it seems to me, make it reasonable for the Molinist to resist this
modified argument against the possibility of universal TWD.
To see the argument, we need to remind ourselves that the counterdefender needs all of the premises of his counterargument to be necessary
truths. If any of them are not necessary truths, then the bare logical possibility of all of Plantinga’s premises will have established the bare logical
compossibility of God and evil. So it is crucial to the Pruss-style argument
under consideration now that the free will defender be forced, in essence,
to recognize DP* as expressing a necessary truth. Again, as I said above,
I am tempted to accept this myself. But I do believe that resistance on
this point can be coherent. This is because I believe there is an important
tension between the conditions for free will and conditions for successful
domination (as expressed in DP*). The reason to resist DP simpliciter, I
have claimed, is that simple domination may not be enough to guarantee
action when an agent is in a close-call situation and the deliberations
involve something like incommensurate values. DP* can avoid this objection by allowing God to strengthen the domination however much is
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necessary to satisfy the antecedent of a true CCF with the desirable freeactional consequent. What is unclear in this case, however, is just how
much strengthening of the domination (and of what form) will remain
compatible with the significance of the free will that is part of both the letter
and the spirit of Plantinga’s original FWD.
DP was supposed to work without undercutting any of our intuitions
about the deep freedom that agents under light domination would enjoy.
Adding $1,000 or a divine command favoring the action freely chosen
without dominance seems to have no effect whatsoever on our sense of
both the existence and significance of the agent’s free will. This is to say
that bringing it about that C* obtained appeared to us to represent no
threat to the freedom that the agent expressed in choosing A under these
conditions. But must we be so sanguine about the threat when it becomes
necessary for God to bring about, instead, some C** that will counter what
we have been referring to as close calls? Not obviously. Since close-call
Curley isn’t moved much by the $1,000 and close-call Eve isn’t moved
much by God’s prohibitions, God will have to do more to satisfy the antecedent of the relevant CCF in these (and related) cases. Perhaps he will
have to add considerably more money to the bribe or a threat to Smith
family safety in Curley’s case. In Eve’s, maybe he will need to add a strong
desire in Eve to care about divine prohibitions or a massively increased
payoff in yumminess for apple-eating. The important thing is that, given
our argument earlier with respect to close calls, we have no way of being
sure that only small elements of dominance will issue in the CCFs a Prussstyle argument will require.
Two possible lines of argument seem to me to be available to the proponent of Plantinga’s FWD here. Some will be prepared to argue that,
possibly, no amount of additional dominance sufficient to guarantee the
desired action will be compatible with the agent’s free choice. That is,
some may be inclined to argue that even DP* can be rejected since it is
possible that no one who would freely perform an action under conditions
C would freely perform the same action under dominated conditions that
nevertheless preserve the agent’s freedom. Of course, there are some conditions under which the dominance would guarantee that the agent act in
the desired way—but, possibly, all such strengthening will have to go
beyond the limits of free will. Thus, it is possible that there is no relevant
C** for DP*.
Another possible line of reply would be to allow that DP* is strictly
true but to insist that, possibly, all of the ways in which DP* is true involve
a crucial degradation of the freedom agents express under the relevant
dominance. The argument here would then amount to the claim that DP*
cannot generate the form of conclusion that is relevant to a rejection of the
free will defense. In favor of this line of argument is the fact that the preservation of an insignificant form of free will (akin to the freedom to choose
between soup or salad at lunch) would not be enough to undermine the
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FWD since, as Plantinga emphasized, the freedom of will in question is
presumed to ground a suite of morally important properties for human
beings. What the proponent of the FWD might reasonably claim, then, is
that, possibly, all the forms of dominance that could issue in true CCFs
with the desired actional consequents would so diminish the remaining
free will as to be unfit for its deep moral tasks. And notice that the theist
could affirm this possibility without insisting that DP* is false.
Suppose, for example, that the C** required to get Curley to choose
freely to accept the bribe involves a threat to his family. Or suppose that
the C** required to get Eve to choose freely to eat the apple involves a
massive increase in the perceived yumminess of the apple. In such cases,
it is not incredible that while something properly called free will remains,
its moral significance is substantially diminished. As a parallel, Aristotle’s
ship captain is relevant. The captain throws the cargo overboard during
a storm in order to weather it safely. The question is whether he throws
the cargo overboard freely (“voluntarily” in Aristotle’s terms).13 Aquinas
considers this case and concludes that the action is partially free and partially unfree.14 There are textual puzzles about how to interpret his claims
on this point, of course. What matters, though, is that most will share the
intuitive judgment that there is an important respect in which the context
of the ship captain’s action mitigates its moral significance even when we
continue to allow that the action is free under some description. The same
seems to be true when, for example, a person gives up her wallet at gunpoint. There is some sense in which she does so freely—she had available
to her the option of forcing the gunman to kill her to get it. But it is not a
sense in which her moral claim on the wallet has been forfeited, as presumably it would be if she had given it up in response to a mere request.
The point is that free choices can be made in contexts that undermine their
moral significance to such a degree that very little by way of the standard
supervenience of the moral life upon such choices would make much
sense. The proponent of Plantinga’s FWD can make use of these points
in response to the Pruss-style dominance argument deploying DP*. Once
the possibility is raised that all sufficient dominance would diminish the
moral significance of the choices, it becomes incumbent upon the counterdefender to show that this is not possible. Nothing in Pruss’s argument
even purports to do this.
4. Conclusion
Since the proponent of the FWD can reject DP and either resist DP* or grant
it but deny that it can function to get the conclusion the counter-defender
13
Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Hackett Publishing Company,
1999), 30.
14
St. Thomas Aquinas, Treatise On Happiness, trans. John A. Oesterle (University of Notre
Dame Press, 1983), 76. (ST IaIIae6.6).
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needs, I conclude that a Pruss-style dominance objection does not threaten
the success of Plantinga’s original response to the logical problem of evil.15
Loyola Marymount University

15
For comments on earlier drafts of this paper I would like to thank Tom Crisp, Mike Rea,
Daniel Howard-Snyder, Alexander Pruss, and (most especially) Tom Flint.

